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Resumo:  Em  anos  recentes  um  número  expressivo  de  filósofos  tem  defendido  que  a 
Literatura  é  parte  do  estudo  da  Filosofia  Moral.  Eles  argumentam,  principalmente  com 
relação  a  novelas,  em  razão  de  suas  características  narrativas,  que  essas  obras  contêm 
pensamento moral que objetiva convencer racionalmente ao se constituírem como formas de 
instrução emocional. Neste trabalho, eu gostaria de oferecer uma resposta à pergunta sobre 
se David Hume em sua filosofia prática está comprometido com tal visão das relações entre a 
Literatura e a Filosofia Moral e se ele pensa que seja adequado usar as técnicas normalmente 
consideradas pertencerem à Literatura no seu ofício de filósofo moral. Minha resposta será 
negativa.
Palavras-chave: Filosofia Moral, Literatura, David Hume.
Abstract:  In  recent  years,  an  expressive  number  of  philosophers  have  defended  that 
literature is part of the study of moral philosophy. They argue, mainly in relation to novels,  
in reason of their narrative features, that these works contain moral thinking that aims to 
convince rationally by being a form of emotional instruction. In this paper, I would like to  
give  an  answer  to  the  question  about  whether  David  Hume in  his  moral  philosophy is 
committed  to  such  a  view of  the  relation  between  literature  and  moral  philosophy  and 
whether he thinks fit to use the techniques normally considered to pertain to literature in his  
labour. My answer will be negative.
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“-And, alas! How always known no principle to supply as a duty what the heart 
was deficient in.” 
Jane Austen, Mansfield Park  (p.327, Penguin).
In this work I would like to give an answer to the following question: Does 
Hume in  his  moral  philosophy employ the  means  that  have  been  recently  made 
explicit by philosophers who defend that literature is moral philosophy? To answer 
this question it will be important, firstly, to give an account of what are the means 
mentioned. This I will do in the first part of my paper. In the second part, I will  
address  the  main  question  here  proposed:  the  relation  between  Hume’s  moral 
philosophy and a certain perspective of thinking on literature, or about one type of 
literature. I would like to make clear at the start that my main interest here is not to 
discuss the merits of the view of those who maintain that some literature is moral 
philosophy.
Literature as Moral Philosophy
In  recent  years  philosophers  have been calling  attention  to  some procedures  that 
writers, especially novelists, use to achieve their aims in writing. I would like to 
mention  three  such  philosophers:  Cora  Diamond,  Martha  Nussbaum  and  Alice 
Crary1. It is easier to understand the conception of the possibilities of literature in 
relation with moral philosophy when one plots it against the view criticized by those 
philosophers. This view has been nicknamed “the prevalent view”2. In a nutshell, this 
is the view that literature with its specificities can be  useful to moral philosophy, 
instrumentally useful. 
1
 Cf. Diamond: “Anything but Argument?”; “Missing the Adventure: Reply to Martha Nussbaum”; 
“Having  a  Rough Story about  What  Moral  Philosophy Is”  in:  The Realistic  Spirit,  Wittgenstein,  
Philosophy and the Mind (Cambridge MA, The MIT Press, 1995). Nussbaum:  Poetic Justice, The  
Literary Imagination and Public Life  (Boston, Beacon Press, 1995);  Love’s Knowledge: Essays on 
Philosophy and Literature (New York, Oxford UP, 1990); and Crary: “Does the Study of Literature  
Belong Within  Moral  Philosophy? Reflections  in  the  Light  of  Ryle’s  Thought” in:  Philosophical  
Investigations, Vol.23 Nº 4, October 2000.
2
 Cf.  Diamond  (“Having  a  Rough  Story”,  p.372)  and  Crary  (op.cit.,  pp.315-24)  for  a  detailed 
presentation of this view, specially in relation to D. D. Raphael. 
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The view holds that literary texts can be useful for moral philosophy because 
they  might  contain  explicit  arguments  in  favor  of  certain  moral  theories  or 
conceptions  of  morality.  Literary  texts  may  also  be  of  importance  for  moral 
philosophy as far as they present and even explore certain ideas in a more free and 
unencumbered context, ideas which, if well articulated and put in the form of explicit 
arguments, are the subject-matter of moral theorizing. Moreover, literary works can 
be extremely important  for moral  philosophy,  according to the “prevalent  view”, 
when we find in  them the treatment,  the  characterization,  and the description of 
particular actions, of particular characters, all which constitutes the true material for 
the theorist of morality to work on, so that they may have a clearer understanding of 
human conduct in their theorizing, and consequently be freed from the dangers of 
superficiality in relation to human life.
This  “prevalent  view”  of  the  relationship  between  literature  and  moral 
philosophy clearly involves a specific conception about the nature and purposes of 
moral philosophy. As a matter of fact, it is because of this conception that this view 
relegates literature, according to its critics, to a true secondary position, even though 
the defenders of the view would discuss this qualification, arguing eventually that the 
position is not secondary, given that it is an important position and actually the only 
possible when the issue is morality. The conception in question is that it is moral 
philosophy that contains the true contents of moral rationality par excellance. Moral 
philosophy is, from this point of view, the intellectual enterprise that is involved 
exclusively with arguments, with reasoning in which we pass from certain assertions 
to  some  other  assertions.  On  what  morality  is,  and  on  what  constitutes  its 
foundations, the differences between, for example, Hume and Kant are understood to 
stand  only  in  different  and  distinct  assertions  and  arguments,  via  inferences, 
concerning them. So far, this view of moral philosophy, as is clearly surmisable, is 
committed to a wide spread and common understanding of what rationality comes to. 
Rationality is commonly taken to require the exclusion of all  types of emotional 
involvement, requiring that one leaves out of consideration capacities specifically 
emotional, in general, emotional answers to circumstances. For this conception, it is 
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only important  that  there be arguments,  discourses  in  which one finds structured 
arguments and formal and material inferences3.
Which are, then, the literary procedures that would point towards something 
different  from  what  the  “prevalent  view”  says  about  the  relationship  between 
literature  and moral  philosophy? What is  the  alternative conception? How can it 
prove  itself?  One  formulation  gives  an  important  hint  to  what  is  involved  in  a 
different conception: “(…) The domain of rational moral reflection is wider than the 
domain of argument”4. The other type of conception maintains that, in a Rylean style, 
“the training or habituation of feeling plays an essential role in the growth of moral 
understanding”5. The relevant literary procedures are, then, accordingly, these related 
to sentiments. However, they are these which do not simply provoke emotions, but 
rather  direct our emotional responses and are capable therewith to produce rational 
conviction and be therefore a form of moral instruction. So, literature, as literature, or 
even in reason of what is peculiar to its form, to the type of discourse or text it is, 
may contain its own moral thinking. This not as the “predominant view” would have 
it, and also not in the vacuous sense that the author who would be willing to write in 
accordance to this view would have to exercise his reasoning powers. The literary 
procedures, proper to literature, which may contain moral thinking, are the narrative 
strategies which establish a standard of affective reactions that can lead to a rational 
conviction that a determined manner of looking at certain areas of human life  is 
better  or  the  correct  one.  So,  for  instance,  the  novels  by  Jane  Austen  provoke 
emotional responses when we are presented with distinct situations and characters, 
which lead to an appreciation of what is an adequate sensibility, a proper pride, a 
critical susceptibility to being persuaded, and a way of relating to others without 
undue interference. The novel takes us, through distinctive emotional responses, to 
identify  some  standards  in  our  own  lives  that  are  only  visible  because  of  our 
3
 Cf. Diamond,  op.cit. p.368; and Crary,  op.cit. p.316. Kant seems to be very clear on the point: 
“Morality cannot ... be based on any pathological principle, neither on a physical nor yet on a moral 
feeling.  Moreover,  to  have recourse  to  feeling in  the case of  a  practical  rule is  quite  contrary to 
philosophy. Every feeling has only a private validity, and no man´s feeling can be apprehended by 
another. If a man argues that ‘he feels in himself that it is so’, his argument is a tautology. His feeling 
can have no value for others, and the man who once appeals to his feelings forswears all rational  
grounds” (Lectures on Ethics, trans. Louis Infield, London, Methuen, 1979; p.38).
4
 Cf. Crary, op.cit. p. 318.
5
 Cf. Crary, op.cit. p. 315.
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emotional  engagement  with  the  novel.  The  moral  contribution  of  the  novels,  as 
literary works of art with their own features and modes, lies with the understanding 
they offer of the important moral elements of our lives. In reading the novels we 
trace  the  standards  in  our  emotional  responses,  which  makes  us  better  able  to 
understand the story and our own lives6. However, this bettered understanding is not 
one in which what is in the forefront is a pure intellection.
I would like to quote two comments that illuminate the scope and nature of 
what is involved in this type of understanding. To be sure, to clarify what they have 
to do with a particular type of moral theory requires much more than what I intend to 
do  in  this  paper.  The  first  comment  is  by  Gilbert  Ryle  and  the  second  by  Iris 
Murdoch.
However pivotal it may be to the notion of a proper human being that he 
has  some  capacity,  however  slight,  to  produce  and  follow  proofs  of 
propositions; or to give and accept reasons for propositions; or to draw 
and concur in inferences from propositions; still surely it is not only for 
his  puny,  modest  or  glorious  accomplishments  in  this  dry  and  chilly 
propositional arena that we grade his life as a man’s life as distinct from a 
brute’s life, an infant’s life or an idiot’s life (…). Surely men differ from 
lions  and infants  in  being  liable  to  sillinesses,  stupidities  and  wrong-
headednesses other than scholastic ones, and in being capable of being 
judicious in other ways than judicial ways7.
When we apprehend and assess other people we do not consider only 
their solutions to specifiable practical problems, we consider something 
more elusive which may be called their total vision of life, as shown in 
their mode of speech or silence, their choice of words, their assessment of 
others, their conception of their own lives, what they think attractive or 
praiseworthy, what they think funny: in short, the configurations of their 
thought which show continually in their reaction and conversation. These 
things, which may be overtly and comprehensibly displayed or inwardly 
6
 Cf. Crary, op.cit. p.330.
7
 Gilbert Ryle Critical Essays (Collected Papers, Vol 1, Thoemmes, Bristol, 1990) pp.416-7, apud 
Crary, op.cit. p. 319.
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elaborated and guessed at, constitute what, making different points in the 
two metaphors, one may call the texture of a man’s being or the nature of 
his personal vision8.
Hume and Moral Philosophy
Four points will be dealt with in order to get at an answer to my initial question. 
Firstly, I shall comment on a text by Hume where he seems to be dealing exactly 
with what is occupying me in this paper. This will function more as a starter.
In his work on the foundations of morality, after countering the skeptics and 
clarifying that he will reveal to us the “true origin” of morality through a search of its 
universal  principles,  Hume  turns  to  benevolence  in  his  Enquiry  concerning  the  
Principles of Morals. This “social virtue” does not seem to require,  according to 
Hume, any proof that it is estimable. It would suffice to remind us of the meanings of 
those  epithets  that  we  find  in  every  language,  such  as  sociable,  good-natured, 
humane, merciful, grateful, friendly, generous, beneficent. For Hume, these are the 
terms that are used to express the highest praise human nature is able to get. And 
after giving as examples Pericles and Juvenal, Hume stops in his strides and censures 
himself in the following manner.
But I forget, that it is not my present business to recommend generosity 
and benevolence, or to paint, in their true colours, all the genuine charms 
of the social virtues. These, indeed, sufficiently engage every heart, on 
the first apprehension of them; and it is difficult to abstain from some 
sally of panegyric, as often as they occur in discourse or reasoning. But  
our  object  here  being  more the  speculative,  than  the  practical  part  of 
morals, it will suffice to remark, (what will readily, I believe, be allowed) 
that  no  qualities  are  more  entitled  to  the  general  good-will  and 
approbation of mankind than beneficence and humanity, friendship and 
gratitude, natural affection and public spirit, or whatever proceeds from a 
tender sympathy with others, and a generous concern for our kind and 
species. These, wherever they appear, seem to transfuse themselves, in a 
8
 Iris Murdoch “Vision and Choice in Morality” in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,  
Supplementary Vol. 30 (1956) p.39, apud Diamond, op.cit. p.374.
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manner, into each beholder,  and to call  forth, in their  own behalf,  the 
same favourable and  affectionate  sentiments,  which  they  exert  on  all 
around9.
Hume’s point in the passage seems to be clear10. His purpose, as a researcher 
of human nature, is not to “paint” the charms of human social virtues, but rather to 
explain their nature from a speculative point of view, that is, from the perspective of 
theory. But then natural questions are: when Hume reminded us of what was said and 
done by Pericles and Juvenal, was not Hume occupying himself with the “practical 
part of morals”? And how does function such a reminder in this context? And if 
Hume’s main goal is theoretical, why reach a point where one has to censure oneself 
for having taken another tack? Was Hume tempted by such an approach more than 
was acceptable in his own eyes? And if he is now getting away from the art of the 
painter, is he thereby getting closer to doing the job of the anatomist? I will not be 
giving answers to each of these questions. I propose to turn the attention to the place 
where Hume presents the distinction here appealed to and which is at the basis of 
Hume’s presentation of two manners one can approach the task of doing philosophy 
in his first Enquiry. Let us deal, then, with this second point, where Hume says what 
is his conception of the task as a whole of philosophy.
In the first section of the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, Hume 
distinguishes two “species” of philosophy. He says:
The one considers man chiefly as born for action; and as influenced in his 
measures  by  taste  and  sentiment;  pursuing  one  object,  and  avoiding 
another, according to the value which these objects seem to possess, and 
9
 Hume, Section 2 (“Of Benevolence”) of An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals (Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1975; ed. P.H. Nidditch); pp. 177-8.
10
 M.A. Box has a different view of what Hume is up to at this point: “Initially this [reminder] seems a 
plain denial of any hortatory intentions. But on the other hand it is also plainly an admission that he  
has just been engaged in recommending a virtue and painting its charms. Hume is being arch. He has 
not really caught himself in getting carried away; he is just imitating, as eighteenth-century prose 
stylists tended to do, the casual discontinuities, hesitations, afterthoughts, and backpedallings of actual  
conversation.  If  his  commendatory  painting  of  benevolence  were  really  a  deviation  from  his  
intentions, he could easily have struck it out. The only reason for failing to revise the discussion of 
benevolence is that it did indeed reflect his intentions” (The Suasive Art of David Hume, Princeton 
University Press, 1990; p.243).
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according to the light in which they present themselves. As virtue, of all  
objects, is allowed to be the most valuable, this species of philosophers 
paint her in the most amiable colours; borrowing all helps from poetry 
and eloquence, and treating their subject in an easy and obvious manner, 
and  such  as  is  best  fitted  to  please  the  imagination,  and  engage  the 
affections. They select the most striking observations and instances from 
common life; place opposite characters in a proper contrast; and alluring 
us into the paths of virtue by views of glory and happiness, direct our 
steps  in  these  paths  by  the  soundest  precepts  and  most  illustrious 
examples. They make us feel the difference between vice and virtue; they 
excite and regulate our sentiments; and so they can but bend our hearts to 
the  love  of  probity  and  true  honour,  they  think,  that  they  have  fully 
attained the end of all their labours11.
But  there  is  also  another  species  of  philosophy,  or  of  manner  of  doing 
philosophy.
The  other  species  of  philosophers  consider  man  in  the  light  of  a 
reasonable  rather  than  an  active  being,  and  endeavour  to  form  his 
understanding  more  than  cultivate  his  manners.  They  regard  human 
nature as a subject of speculation; and with a narrow scrutiny examine it, 
in order to find those principles which regulate our understanding, excite, 
our  sentiments,  and  make  us  approve  or  blame any particular  object, 
action,  or  behaviour.  They  think  it  a  reproach  to  all  literature,  that 
philosophy should not yet have fixed, beyond controversy, the foundation 
of morals, reasoning, and criticism; and should for ever talk of truth and 
falsehood, vice and virtue, beauty and deformity, without being able to 
determine the source of this distinctions12.
The first species of philosophy Hume says is “easy and obvious”, and the 
second, “accurate and abstruse”. And a bit later in the section Hume uses the analogy 
11
 Hume, Section 1 (“Of the Different Species of Philosophy”) of   An Enquiry concerning Human  
Understanding (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1975; ed. P.H. Nidditch); pp. 5-6.
12
 Hume, op.cit. p.6.
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already implied to make the point in question and declares what place he wants to 
occupy. He says he wants to make the work of the “anatomist” which will be  of  
service to the “painter”. “Accuracy is, in every case, advantageous to beauty, and just 
reasoning to delicate sentiment. In vain would we exalt the one by depreciating the 
other”13.
Hume seems to prefer to be taken as an “anatomist”, and not as a “painter”, 
and this means to be taken as a metaphysician14 in opposition to what we nowadays 
would call “pamphleteers” of the virtues, as Francis Hutcheson –  as it seemed to  
Hume – who recommended and practiced a certain “warmth in the cause of virtue”15.
We can say, therefore, that up to this point, on the face of it, we should give a 
negative answer to my initial question. Let’s get to the third and last point I am going 
to discuss. How does Hume intend to produce  conviction  in relation to his moral 
philosophy? Let me clarify the meaning of this question.
The  author  of  the  Treatise had  as  his  main  goal  to  offer  his  readers  a 
“knowledge  of  man”  that  would  come  as  the  result  of  the  introduction  of  “the 
13
 Hume, op.cit. p.10.
14
 Cf. Michel Malherbe’s comments on this text: “It must be observed that the more Hume builds up  
the merits of the easy philosophy written for the polite society or l’honnête homme – Shaftesbury’s or 
Hutcheson’s philosophy – the more he increases the need for the abstract study of the human mind  
(…) This text [the one under discussion from Section 1] is well known, and very instructive, if we  
heed the balance that Hume is seeking to strike. It asserts the need and right of rational and systematic  
philosophy, to study not only the powers of human understanding, but also the principles of human 
life.  There  is  no  ambiguity  on this  point:  the  science  of  morals  itself  should  be  dealt  with  in  a  
systematic  manner.  (…)  At  first  sight,  Hume might  seem,  by  contrast,  to  have  chosen  the  easy 
philosophy in this work [the second Enquiry] (and an easy style that emulates the spirit of dialogue 
writing), rather than the speculative philosophy. We might think, then, that he intended the operation 
of the speculative philosophy to be postponed until the appendices. Would Hume have lowered his 
ambitions in this way, and moved to this more modest conception of philosophy, one much nearer to 
Shaftesbury’s specification? I think not” (“Hume and the art of dialogue” in: M.A. Stewart & John P. 
Wright (eds.):  Hume and Hume’s Connexions,  The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995, pp. 
201-23), pp.213-4.
15
 Cf. M.A. Stewart: “Two Species of Philosophy: The Historical Significance of the First Enquiry” in: 
Millican, Peter  (ed.):  Reading Hume on Human Understanding  (Oxford, Clarendon Press,  2002), 
pp.67-95; specially pp.73-6. The general tenor of Stewart’s paper is in line with the position adopted  
in the present one, but the most impressive claim he makes is the following: “If the associations of the  
‘easy’ philosophy are derogatory and anti-intellectual – though its contents varies – then the ascription 
to Hume himself of the dictum of ‘Nature’ must be a reversal of his intended sense. ‘Be a Philosopher; 
but amidst all your Philosophy, be still a Man’ (PE 7; E 9) is the poet’s attitude to philosophy that he 
repudiates” (p.91). M.A. Box views this text from a different perspective. After referring to Pope’s 
“Epistle  to James Cragg…,” lines 12-13: “But candid, free,  sincere,  as you began, /  Proceed – a 
Minister, but still a Man”, Box comments on Hume’s text: “This passage could serve as a diagnosis of 
the failings that doomed the Treatise and can give us insights into Hume’s disowning of his first book. 
Hume had come to believe that  the science of the  Treatise had not been quite ‘human’ enough” 
(op.cit., p.47).
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experimental  Method  of  Reasoning  into  Moral  Subjects”  or  “the  application  of 
experimental philosophy to moral subjects” (T p.XVI). The goal was “to explain the 
principles of human nature” (T p.XVI)16. In this vein, Hume could be interested in 
producing  the  sort  of  conviction  that  is  typically  linked  to  the  satisfactory 
explanation of a phenomenon, in this case, the phenomenon of morals, and this in so 
far as he discovers its “foundations”, that is, its “principles” or main causes. 
However,  Hume seems  to  be  worried  with  his  work  as  a  philosopher  in 
another way as well. He also seems to be interested in a certain type of assessment of 
the  result  of  his  work.  At  the  end  of  the  Treatise,  Hume  maintains,  as  against 
Hutcheson, that “sympathy is the chief source of moral distinctions” (T p.618) [NB: 
the “chief” and not the only] and comments: “Those who resolve the sense of morals 
into  original  instincts  of  the  human  mind,  may  defend  the  cause  of  virtue  with 
sufficient authority; but want the advantage, which those possess, who account for 
that sense by an extensive sympathy with mankind. According to the latter system, 
not only virtue must be approv’d of, but also the sense of virtue: And not only that 
sense, but also the principles, from whence it is deriv’d. So that nothing is presented 
on any side, but what is laudable and good” (T p.619). And in this manner, according 
to Hume, “all lovers of virtue (…) must certainly be pleas’d to see moral distinctions 
deriv’d from so noble a source, which gives us a just notion both of the generosity 
and  capacity of  our  nature”  (T  p.619).  That  is,  Hume seems  to  recommend his 
system, because according to it the “source” of morality is noble. Hume seems to be 
saying  not  only  that  his  system  is  the  correct  one  from  the  point  of  view  of 
explanation, but also that it is a satisfactory position to hold, that his explanation of 
the  principle  of  sympathy is  “advantageous”  because  it  reveals  it  as  intrinsically 
satisfactory to us, as “noble”. How can an “anatomist” do this? Should not he be 
worried only about truth? However, it seems that this “noble source” is not merely 
any sort of supplementary result of the explanatory goal, a sort of plus obtained in 
the work of explaining. This assessment looks like, in the hands of Hume, a manner 
of showing the relevance of the system of explanation being offered. What is Hume 
16
 “T” is for Treatise of Human Nature (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1978; ed. P.H. Nidditch).
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thinking he  is  doing at  this  point,  an  effort  that  has  been taken as  a  “reflective 
endorsement” account of the normativity of morals?17
Nonetheless, Hume does at this point precisely what he later repeated in the 
second Enquiry, that is, in a kind way censors himself for getting out of the track.
But I forbear insisting on this subject. Such reflections require a work a-
part, very different from the genius of the present. The anatomist ought 
never  to  emulate  the  painter:  nor  in  his  accurate  dissections  and 
portraitures of the smaller parts of the human body, pretend to give his 
figures any graceful and engaging attitude or expression. There is even 
something hideous, or at least minute in the views of things, which he 
presents; and ‘tis necessary the objects shoul’d be set more at a distance, 
and be more cover’d up from sight, to make them engaging to the eye and 
imagination (T pp.620-1). 
What seems clear, then, is that Hume again insists on the importance of the 
anatomist for the painter with his practical morality, a science that can then be “more 
correct in its precepts and more persuasive in its exhortations” (T p.621)18.
The final answer we reach then has to be that (1) even though Hume seems to 
have been tempted by a way of proceeding which is not that of the anatomist; and (2) 
17
 Cf. Christine Korsgaard, Sources of Normativity (Cambridge, Cambridge UP, 1996), passim.
18
 M.A. Box sees the second  Enquiry as Hume’s most accomplished attempt to bring together the 
defense of certain philosophical positions with the employment of appropriate literary resources in a 
larger project of “anatomizing” and “painting” the virtues. Box claims that through the means of a 
certain  presentation  of  historical  data,  anecdotes  and  quotations,  Hume  is  able  to  “stimulate” 
sentiments and inculcate morality, because “they depict characters and situations that can stimulate 
calm passions in us as abstract discussion cannot”. So, “through his allusions in the second Enquiry 
Hume incorporates into his accurate investigations some of the affective value of history. Nowhere 
else are his anatomical procedures and belletristic purposes so seamlessly joined” (op.cit.,  p.242). 
However, this still seems to be the presentation of particular examples so that they help to convince on 
the basis, as it were, of their own intrinsic appeal, as models only. That is also why in part Box asks in  
the continuation the question on the “painterly recommendation” and refers to a literary form which is 
“catalogue poetry”: “Hume’s advancement of old verities is well integrated into the exposition of his 
abstruse tenets. His emphasis is on anatomy, but he makes his findings support the old verities (…).  
However, this is recommendation of virtue by argument. What about painterly recommendation, and 
how is this activity integrated into a series of arguments? We have already noted that his use of  
historical illustrations both substantiates his points and serves to arouse the desired calm passions. 
Moreover, he sets these illustrations within a particular literary structure that serves both the purposes 
of  expositing  tenets  and  of  portraying  the  charms  of  virtue.  Hume  presents  the  virtues  to  us  
systematically by means of a catalogue (…). We commonly associate the catalogue as a literary form 
with ancient poetry (…)”. (op.cit., pp.247-8).
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because he does not attempt to clarify the nature of the procedure which points to the 
“advantage” of his explanation of the principle of sympathy, Hume in fact intends 
that (3) his text, his type of writing, convinces by appeal to a rational  intellectual 
reflection, that his writing should be understood and should convince because of the 
application of the  understanding to his theses and doctrines. Therefore, the answer 
we judge proper to give to our initial question is negative.
So,  even if  Hume in the first  Enquiry ended Section 1 suggesting that he 
would  be  happy  if  he  could  “unite  the  boundaries  of  the  different  species  of 
philosophy, by reconciling profound enquiry with clearness, and truth with novelty”, 
and that even more happiness would result from a “reasoning”, though in an “easy 
manner”, that would “undermine the foundations” of “abstruse philosophy”, this can 
in  fact  be  achieved  through “the  only  catholic  remedy”,  which  is  “fitted  for  all 
dispositions; and is able to subvert that abstruse philosophy and metaphysical jargon, 
which, being mixed up with popular superstition, renders it in a manner impenetrable 
to careless reasoners, and gives it the air of science and wisdom”, and this unique 
remedy is “accurate and just reasoning”19.
Coda
A last point should be dealt with in order to help to round up my argument. How 
bears what Hume says in the famous “Of the Standard of Taste”20 on my question? 
To begin with, one should not forget the purpose of that piece and the manner 
Hume intends to address the topic of a standard pertaining to criticism and possibly 
to morals. Hume says this about the point: “But as our intention in this essay is to 
mingle some light of the understanding with the feelings of sentiment, it  will  be 
proper to give a more accurate definition of delicacy (…)” (ST p.234). So, it is a 
work intending to increase our understanding of this vexed topic.
If we turn now to the use Hume makes of names such as Homer and Fénelon, 
we first get the point that presumably good literature gets it right, from the point of 
19
 Hume “Of the Different Species of Philosophy”, pp.12, 13, 16.
20
 In: --- : Essays, Moral, Political and Literary (ed. by Eugene F. Miller: Liberty Fund, Indianapolis, 
1987),  pp.226-49.  I  will  quote  from  this  work  using  “ST”  followed  by  page  number  in  this  
publication.
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view of morals, in the  general, not necessarily in the  particular. And he explains 
why: 
It  is indeed obvious, that writers of all  nations and all  ages concur in 
applauding justice,  humanity,  magnanimity,  prudence,  veracity;  and in 
blaming  the  opposite  qualities.  Even  poets  and  other  authors,  whose 
compositions  are  chiefly  calculated  to  please  the  imagination,  are  yet 
found from HOMER down to FENELON, to inculcate the same moral 
precepts, and to bestow their applause and blame on the same virtues and 
vices. This great unanimity is usually ascribed to the influence of plain 
reason; which, in all these cases, maintains similar sentiments in all men, 
and prevents those controversies, to which the abstract sciences are so 
much  exposed.  So  far  as  the  unanimity  is  real,  this  account  may  be 
admitted as satisfactory: But we must also allow that some part of the 
seeming harmony in morals may be accounted for from the very nature of 
language. (...) HOMER’S general precepts, where he delivers any such, 
will  never  be  controverted;  but  it  is  obvious,  that,  when  he  draws 
particular pictures of manners, and represents heroism in ACHILLES and 
prudence in ULYSSES, he intermixes a much greater degree of ferocity 
in the former, and of cunning and fraud in the latter,  than FENELON 
would admit (ST p.228).
Hume’s view is that literature may please the imagination, with its portraits 
of virtue and vice, more easily in the general than in the particular, facilitated then by 
the “very nature of language”, and thereby a piece of literature might avoid losing, 
and this is the point in question, aesthetic value. At the beginning of his essay, Hume 
is pointing out the variety of appraisals of aesthetic value, and with the comparison 
of Homer and Fénelon he is able to present incipiently his view of such a variety. 
When at the end of the essay he addresses the “celebrated controversy concerning 
ancient and modern learning”, Hume comes back to Homer, the author: “The want of 
humanity and decency, so conspicuous in the characters drawn by several  of the 
ancient poets, even sometimes by HOMER and the GREEK tragedians, diminishes 
considerably the merit  of their noble performances,  and gives modern authors an 
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advantage over them”(ST p.246).  However,  it  seems that we shouldn’t think that 
Homer’s artistic merit is in peril, because Hume allows that “a man of learning and 
reflection  can make allowance for  these  peculiarities  of  manners;  but  a  common 
audience can never divest themselves so far of their usual ideas and sentiments, as to 
relish pictures which no wise resemble them”(ST p.245). There is one type of case 
where we get “eternal blemishes” for a work of art, this is when the heart of the  
author is possessed by principles of “bigotry or superstition”. “Where that happens, 
they confound the sentiments of morality, and alter the natural boundaries of vice 
and virtue” (ST p.247). But - and this is what we should take notice of - these defects 
detract, in Hume’s ongoing discussion, from “the value of those composition” (ST 
p.246) or from “the merit  of their  noble performances”, as he said of the ancient 
Greeks. 
This fits well with a point of general importance Hume makes elsewhere in 
the essay. Hume claims that types of writings and “performances” have different 
goals. He says that “every work of art has also a certain end or purpose, for which it  
is calculated; and is to be deemed more or less perfect, as it is more or less fitted to 
attain this end. The object of eloquence is to persuade, of history to instruct, and of  
poetry  to  please  by  means  of  the  passions  and the  imagination”  (ST p.240,  my 
italics).  So,  what we get  is  the view that  we can be so pleased by the works of  
literature when, in case this is the point in question, they get morals right. Thus far 
the examples, even in their particulars,  illustrate what we could well know with a 
developed “delicacy of taste” by other types of experience.
However, an indication of how Hume sees his task concerning the issue of a 
standard of taste comes with his discussion of where we do find and what are the 
features of “true judge[s]” or “critics” with “the true standard of taste and beauty” 
(ST p.240). He utilizes a distinction in stating what  his purposes are, that between 
“questions  of  fact”  and  “of  sentiment”.  He  intends  to  deal  with  a  question “of 
sentiments”, that is, about sentiments, because what he wants to do is to prove that it 
is  the  sentiments which have to be of a sort  in view of the fact that we possess 
standards of taste and beauty. 
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Hume argues as follows.  Where there is  doubt  about  whether a particular 
person is endowed with “good sense and a delicate imagination”, he claims that the 
situation is the same as with other disputes amenable to the understanding. And to 
solve them we “must produce the best arguments” that we can invent, necessarily 
“acknowledg[ing]  a  true  and  decisive  standard  to  exit  somewhere,  to  wit,  real 
existence and matter of fact”, and we “must have indulgence to such as differ from 
[us] in [our] appeals to this standard”. But what cannot be easily disputed, according 
to Hume, is the fact that someone with good sense and a delicate imagination is 
“valuable and estimable”, this must be “agreed in by all mankind” (loc.cit.). Thus his 
expressed goal: “It is sufficient for our present purpose, if we have proved, that the 
taste of all individuals is not upon an equal footing, and that some men in general, 
however difficult to be particularly pitched upon, will be acknowledged by universal 
sentiment to have a preference above others” (ST p.242, my italics). It is about how 
this  taste  in  fact  gets  to  the  point  of  being  acknowledged  by  this  “universal 
sentiment”, an opinion in fact, of all of us that  Hume wants to speak. He wants to 
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explain how and why only some of us develop a “just sentiment” (ST p.243)21, this 
being, none the less, a fact acknowledged to be such by all of us.
Recebido em 10 de julho de 2011.
Aprovado em 02 de agosto de 2011.
21
 If we understand this “just sentiment” as related to the  moral sentiment of the common point of 
view, as seems reasonable,  we could perhaps be willing to see a structural similarity between the 
workings of the imagination when Hume describes how we imaginatively take the common point of 
view to produce moral pronouncements on the basis of a special feeling (“Sentiments must touch the  
heart, to make them control our passions: But they need not extend beyond the imagination, to make  
them influence  our  taste”  [T  586])  and  the  workings  of  the  literary  imagination  (Hume calls  it  
“invention” in  “Of Standard of  Taste”,  p.240) to elicit  the desired moral-emotive appreciation of  
situations defended by the literature as moral philosophy conception (cf., on the first topic, Rachel  
Cohon:  “The  Common  Point  of  View  in  Hume’s  Ethics”  [Philosophy  and  Phenomenological  
Research,  Vol.LVII,  No  4,  December  1997;  pp.827-50],  specially  pp.836-9.  She  calls  it  “the 
adjustment of emotion as the result of the sympathetic use of the imagination” [p.838] and says it  
involves “a habit of performing [a] imaginative exercise” [p.847]). However, this would be of no help 
with our question, because it seems that for Hume it would still concern what happens with the author 
as she intends to produce a work supposedly to be understood in a certain manner, it would amount to 
a requirement of morality on the author (things would not change, if we maintained that this is what is  
intended the readers  should go through in  reading  the  work,  which  is  what  the  defenders  of  the 
literature as moral philosophy conception also defend). Hume is engaged, in his explanation of how 
some of us get to feel the moral sentiment, with a theoretical account of the nature of the phenomenon  
of morality, one that pertains to the foundations of morality as he conceives of it. This does not seem 
to be related to a type of writing which has recourse to narrative strategies to produce emotional 
engagements that are to convince of certain determinate views of what is good and fit morally, as it is 
claimed Jane Austen, for instance, does. When Hume addresses himself to the specific question of  
how to convince  a “bad critic”,  he suggests  a  procedure  of  attention-guidance through appeal  to  
examples (he also defends the importance of “established models”, cf. ST p.235): “When we prove, 
that the same principle [an avowed principle of art which can be illustrated by examples] may be  
applied to the present case, where he did not perceive or feel its influence: He must conclude… that 
the fault lies with himself, and that he wants the delicacy, which is requisite to make him sensible of 
every beauty and every blemish, in any composition or discourse” (ST, p236). This is the case of what  
is  requisite to make one able to perceive what,  perhaps in reason of its  intricacy and subtlety, is  
difficult to see in the object, as with Sancho Pansa’s kinsmen verdict on the quality of the wine they  
tasted. And what Hume wants is to explain it to us.
None  the  less,  even  if,  in  relation  to  Hume,  one  accepted  that  the  imagination  plays  a 
similarly crucial role in morals and in literature, that role does not seem to be the same in reason of the 
different goals of these “productions”; presumably in morals we should be able to get at certain moral  
pronouncements, whereas in literature it is still a question of enjoyment and pleasure even when the  
work is seen through the moral lenses. It seems to be, in relation to Hume, as Christopher Williams 
puts it a propos the role imaginative literature can play in the cultivation of our moral sensibility: “…
We might have expected Hume to say that works of imagination have a role to play in the evolution… 
of our moral sensibility. To acknowledge this role, we do not need to suppose, as Martha Nussbaum 
has done, that literature purveys fine-grained moral insights that are not independently available. This 
is a strong view, and it raises difficult questions about why the content of these insights must have a  
literary vehicle. A more modest, and adequate enough, view of the moral role of literature results if  
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we note  that  imaginative  enjoyments,  because  of  their  relative  freedom from practical  exigency, 
allows us to entertain sensibility-altering viewpoints that we might not otherwise occupy. Reading a 
literary work can be like listening to the king’s fool, though we should not think that some unwelcome 
news has to be conveyed to the king (or queen). The very liberty of the mind at play, the mind without  
ulterior agenda, advances our moral refinement” (“False Delicacy”, p.246,  in: Anne Jaap Jacobson 
[ed]: Feminist Interpretations of Hume, The Pennsylvania State U.P., 2000, pp.239-62).
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